“A recipe for thought”. •. •. Fred Dretske a sketch of a “naturalistic” account of intentional mental states (a “psychosemantics”). “Thought may be intentional. View Notes – dretske from PHIL at University Of Arizona. Fred Dretske A recipe for thought Phil/Psyc Fall How do you build a thinking thing?. A question about Dretske’s idea that intentionality can be located in things outside of the mind — such as compasses, thermometers, and even.
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Just as when investigating consciousness, problems arise when attempting to find some criterion for an intentional relation in a specific instant. Categories 21st centuryconsumerism, Sigmund Freud, marketing, advertising, wish fulfilment, desiresphysical states.
Sign in Create an account. As with consciousness, the solution is to consider whole system, not just a specific instant of it.
No arrangement of matter, it would seem, could be intentional because we could take an reccipe of that arrangement, and, despite the fact that the image preserves all the relevant information, the image would not have intentionality. Dretske also maintains a causal theory of intentionality such that mental states represent something, like tree rings represent something, and argues that the intentionality of mental states can be reduced to their evolutionary biological function. When I am thinking about something that does not exist, it has no place in the physical world.
Gendered Metaphors for Genetic Medicine. Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: For example, when I see a cat, I am perceptually aware of that cat, or when I believe that it is going to rain, my belief represents a state of the weather. We intuitively understand that there are many kinds of things that can be about other things, for example photographs are about their contents.
Fred Dretske, A Recipe for Thought – PhilPapers
To establish his theory that intentionality is already naturalized, Dretskyp. The Nature of Thought. Wai-Shun Hung – – Philosophy Today 57 3: Fernando Birman – – Disputatio 3 recipee Reblogged this on janetthomas. No keywords specified fix it.
This entry has no external links. Create a free website or blog at WordPress. This claim can be amended to original intentionality is sufficient for mentality, thereby making the claim have some chance of validity Byrne n. Leave a Reply Cancel reply Enter your dretsek here Request removal from index.
With the claim that intentionality is necessary for mentality it can be countered with the claim that sensations are mental states sretske are non-intentional Byrne n.
Fred Dretske – – Philosophical Studies 70 2: For Dretske Jacobinformation exhibits some degree of intentionality and is able to show both the intentionality of beliefs as well as its derived intentionality of an utterance that can misrepresent such information. It is the derived power of such objects to misrepresent that Dretskep. Through his recipe for thought, Dretske is asserting a purely physicalist ontology of the mind.
Recipe of a Life.
Intentionality From a Systems View of the Mind | On Philosophy
A photo of a dog is only about a dog because it invokes in us sensations similar to those that we have when we see a real dog.
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If they had a physical determining dretskw they would not be a mental state because they would be derived from physical perceptions. A Recipe for Homebaked Normativity. This is because intentionality, as presented here, is not a part of the mind, instead it is a way that we can describe or talk about the mind.
A Recipe for Thought
Chisholm accounts for the intentionality of thoughts through language, semantics, and mental expectation. Fortunately, the account we have been developing requires only a small change to account for this.
Of course behavior is how we usually determine whether a system has intentionality, since it is what we can most easily observe, but internal changes thoughts also count, as mentioned above, and so it is possible that some completely immobile systems have intentionality, although we might never know it.